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Introduction 
 
Traditional security approaches do not adequately address all the requirements of open, 
scientific computing facilities. Many of the methods used for more restricted 
environments, including almost all corporate/commercial systems, do not meet the needs 
of today’s science. Use of only the available “state of the practice” commercial methods 
will have adverse impact on the ability of DOE to accomplish its science goals, and 
impacts the productivity of the DOE Science community. In particular, NERSC and other 
high performance computing (HPC) centers have special security challenges that are 
unlikely to be met unless DOE funds development and support of reliable and effective 
tools designed to meet the cyber security needs of High Performance Science. These 
needs include:  
• in-depth auditing of users’ authentication credentials and interactive session 
keystrokes  
• intrusion detection/protection systems (IDS/IPS) and firewalls that can process 10–40 
gigabit per second (Gb/s) single-stream traffic flows without impacting network and 
system performance 
• firewalls designed for the dynamic port usage typical of Grid and other middleware 
(which will protect scientific work in a way similar to how commercial firewalls 
currently deal with FTP) 
• role-based identity management that allows very large ad hoc collaborations to work 
together effectively without compromising security. 
 
These special security needs of open HPC science are not likely to be met by commercial 
security products for one or more of the following reasons: 
• Vendors lack interest in developing and supporting technology without a 
demonstrated, wide market in the commercial and/or commodity space. 
• The higher network performance required for large data transfers is more stringent in 
HPC than in commercial sites, which are dominated by many small flows. 
• Because of their use of advanced technology, high profile, and required openness, 
HPC centers need new security technology sooner than commercial market vendors 
could supply it.  
• HPC sites have tens of thousands of systems — all working in unison. Rolling and 
synchronous updates for security are often not feasible without serious disruption of 
services, so the standard practice in the commercial space is not transferable. 
 
To understand why commercial products will not, for the most part, be adequate to meet 
NERSC’s security needs, it is informative to look at NERSC’s resources, usage patterns, 
and data rates, and compare them to the larger enterprise market typically targeted by 
networking and security companies. While NERSC has some similarities to very large 
corporate networks (such as Google, Schwab, Amazon, etc.) in terms of number and 
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speed of processors, the distribution of computing resources, access patterns, and 
performance requirements are vastly different. 
 
1. NERSC Today 
The mission of the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center (NERSC) is 
to accelerate the pace of scientific discovery by providing high performance computing, 
information, data, and communications services for DOE Office of Science sponsored 
research. NERSC annually supports over 2500 research scientists, more than 50% from 
universities, all of whom access NERSC resources remotely via a wide range of non-
dedicated networks. NERSC resources, which consist of tens of thousands of high speed 
processors, petabytes of data storage, a 100 terabytes (TB) global file system which is 
accessible from all NERSC computational resources, and a 10 Gb/s connection to ESnet 
and the Internet, are a rich prize for a hacker. The challenge for NERSC and the Office of 
Science is to permit these researchers unencumbered access to NERSC resources while 
preventing the resources from being compromised. 
 
NERSC resources are first and foremost open-science HPC resources, which 
differentiates them from both corporate and DOE classified resources. Open science 
means that one to several hundred researchers work on a “community” project from 
almost anywhere in the world. It also means that the researchers are developing and 
testing state-of-the-art computer codes which require execution privileges and 
unrestricted shell access. SSH is the primary means of interactive access, which 
eliminates the possibility of an adversary intercepting (sniffing) a user’s password or 
credential as it travels through the network1. However, in a good example of the on-going 
balance the open security implies, because SSH encrypts all traffic, border intrusion 
detection/prevention systems are blind to the contents of a session.  
 
The research codes developed by the NERSC users stress computer security since they 
can open and utilize a large number (64,512) of unprivileged ports and create new 
services such as permitting multiple researchers to connect to the running code to steer 
the computation and view the results.  
 
High performance implies both a large number of processors and high speed, parallel data 
flows. Today, NERSC computational systems have over 8700 processors which log 
system messages to a central syslog server. Later this year, Franklin, the newest NERSC 
Cray computer, will enter production with an additional 19,344 processors. Day-to-day 
security log analysis is quickly outstripping the capabilities of the human security 
analysts. Every day, about 2 TB of data enters NERSC from the Internet, and 0.4 TB 
leaves NERSC. Unlike corporate sites where the majority of traffic is relatively low 
speed, web server based transactions, the majority of NERSC border traffic is very large 
(>10 GB) bulk data transfers using tools such as FTP and Grid software. The data sizes 
mandate high speed, parallel flows, and traditional security hardware such as commercial 
                                                 
1 Note it is still very possible to steal a user’s credential or password — and credential theft is one of the 
most common forms of attack on NERSC. 
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firewalls are unable to keep pace. NERSC has seen the effect of using commodity 
security components when we receive problem reports of slow transfer rates between a 
scientist’s local systems and NERSC. Many of the problems have to do with the 
limitations imposed by commercial security technology such as firewalls and Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) servers. Similar issues are seen for sites the institute “gateways” 
for users rather than direct access to individual systems. 
 
Figure 1 shows the NERSC System Architecture for 2007.  
 
 
Figure 1. NERSC System Architecture for 2007. 
2. NERSC in the Future 
All HPC centers evolve in order to meet the national needs for competitiveness and to 
stay at the forefront of scientific productivity. A multitude of requirements, many that 
change the fundamental assumptions of the security models and practices, have to be met. 
While in the past, simulation and analysis of simulation results were essentially within a 
center, now there are communities of hundreds that share the work and share the results. 
Interdisciplinary teams of workers create applications that have 100,000–5,000,000 lines 
of code. The rapid expansion of some form of “virtual organization” is pushing the limits 
of what current software and system management can support. On the other hand, VOs 
are becoming a key way of doing large scale science — from climate to fusion to 
experimental data analysis. 
 
In addition to creating new algorithms and applications that have differing profiles, each 
team requires new services. Hence, NERSC and sites like it are constantly expanding 
their service profile. Grid-based services, using new software protocols and layers, are 
quickly emerging with the existence of the Global Grid Forum, the Open Science Grid, 
and the NSF TeraGrid. Application teams, ranging from high energy physics to climate 
research, from astrophysics to quantum chromodynamics, from nanotechnology to life 
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science, all demand collaborative services and data access. Further, science teams will be 
moving more between sites with the DOE and other facilities, as allocations and 
functions change. 
 
The data volumes being handled at NERSC are 20 to 10,000 times more than just ten 
years ago. This will be expanded as new services such as geographically distributed, 
parallel file systems, are deployed. 
3. Current Security Posture 
Figure 2 shows the generic network design of the NERSC network, which is segmented 
into functional areas.  
Figure 2. A general view of a segmented network in an HPC facility. 
 
This arrangement fits into the general security posture at NERSC, which stresses the need 
to do security within an open science environment by extensive monitoring and proactive 
administrative practice. Examples of this include the following operational production 
practices: 
• Internal and external network monitoring. This is used for scan and attack detection, 
as well as providing a detailed protocol analysis useful for forensic analysis. Systems 
used for this include Bro, Snort, and a network traffic bulk recorder which are tied 
together with locally developed scripts. 
• Centralized syslog services. Allows for a single analysis point as well as getting 
logging information off of a host if it is compromised. This also provides a 
convenient way to do detailed login analysis of user activity such as SSH logins 
across the entire center. 
• Selective use of firewalls and port blocking. Firewalls are used internal to the NERSC 
network for critical non-user functions where the need for heightened security 
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outweighs the performance penalty. In addition, a small number of services are 
blocked both on the overall border and between network segments when these 
services are determined to never be needed by the NERSC community. 
• Active vulnerability scanning. All systems are scanned for general security 
vulnerabilities. In addition, specific application scanning is done for specialty systems 
such as database servers.  
• Aggressive administrative controls. Systems are carefully monitored and maintained. 
This includes aggressive system patching and centralized configuration management 
on major systems.  
• System process accounting. On all main systems, some form of process accounting 
records user activities for forensic analysis in the event of an attack. 
• Central account management. NERSC proactively manages all accounts on all 
systems. Accounts are restricted and then removed after a relatively short idle period. 
This decreases the vulnerability from password sniffing. Further, account information 
on all NERSC systems is frequently validated again a known correct database in 
order to find unexpected privileges and accounts. Advanced password formation is 
enforced and checked periodically. 
 
A number of these practices, particularly those relating to system monitoring and the 
need for flexible user services, differentiate the needs of NERSC from those found in the 
standard implementations for commercial situation described in Appendix 1. As 
expected, the presence of large numbers of direct execution shell accounts on high 
performance computing systems poses one of the most significant differentiating factors. 
In light of this, there are a number of improvements that need to be included in the 
protection of an open, scientific facility.  
 
The first category of improvement is user activity monitoring. This includes SSH 
keystroke monitoring, as well as accessing the more ad hoc Grid-related protocols. 
Integrating cross-system process accounting data into a more complete view of the 
activities of a given user’s activity across an entire facility would also go a long way 
toward a improved protection 
 
At a strategic level, the overall network design for both NERSC and most typical large 
corporations is shown in Figure 3, which illustrates NIST guidelines for placing filtering 
routers, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and firewalls within a site’s overall network 
architecture. What is different is the placement of the actual systems that serve the user 
community. Essentially, the major systems in an open facility need to be placed on layers 
closer to the external network. 
 
This network diagram describes three main segments: an external network providing 
services to the public and external users, a main network for services to staff, and a 
special internal network for protecting sensitive systems. Deciding which segment a 
system ends up in is determined by its function (i.e., who is supported and what services 
are provided) rather than by the system’s size or cost. Along the same rationale, the size  
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Figure 3. Recommended firewall design for most large organizations  
(from Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, NIST publication 800-41). 
 
IBM
 
Figure 4. NERSC’s network security configuration. 
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and performance for each of the different network segments are driven by the systems 
and services provided along that segment. 
 
For an example of this network design, we can look at a generic web service provider. In 
their design, web servers are placed on the external network, where the public can have 
access. However, almost all of the work and information is held on servers and data base 
systems that are on other networks that are protected from both the Internet and its own 
web servers in the event that one is compromised. Well defined transactions pass from 
the external servers to the internal, often protected by application-specific firewalls. 
 
NERSC places its HPC systems on the external network, where NERSC users can have 
high performance access, while simultaneously protecting its main network from both the 
Internet and its own HPC systems in the event of system compromise (Figure 4). 
4. Near-Term Goals  
The security challenges facing NERSC, as described above, can be collected into three 
basic problem sets: network performance and dynamics, application complexity and 
diversity, and a complex user community that can have transient affiliations with actual 
institutions. To address these problems, NERSC proposes the following four general 
solutions: 
1. Auditing user and system activity across sites. This describes a consistent set of 
secure tools used to gather end-to-end audit information, as well as the ability to 
detect and respond to actionable events. Currently, IDS logs, session connections, 
batch job files, process accounting (pact), system status monitoring (nagios), 
application performance monitoring (IPM, PAPI) and much other data is collected, at 
least in real time. Each collection is separate and the parameters for analysis, with the 
exception of IDS logs, is non-realtime. This is in part due to the size of the data, and 
in part due to not having defined relationships to look for. The ability to join all this 
data together in real time would provide an enormous improvement in protection. 
This vision should be that of the commercial credit card companies — be able to 
proactively detect possible changes in behavior at an individual user basis and then 
take measures to quickly verify and possibly limit the damage. 
2. Firewall port configuration in real time. This provides the ability for an authenticated 
and appropriately privileged user to modify firewall rules in order to provide for a 
greater level of flexibility in supporting new protocols until firewalls can be taught to 
monitor control traffic and respond dynamically. 
3. Cross-site/virtual organization identity management and access control. As shown in 
Figure 2, even an individual site has multiple protections. The output and logs of each 
device are only correlated today by very smart security and system managers. The 
goal would be to have automated coordination of the observations of these devices, 
not only within a site, but across sites. Furthermore, today’s expansion of virtual 
organizations means that there is less direct management of the work of groups. 
Understanding how to identify participants in VO is challenging, since operating 
systems know only of users and groups. Hence, there is a need for new models and 
approaches to granting/revoking responsibility, authority and privilege, recording use 
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and assigning roles. The goal is to provide the ability to uniquely identify individuals 
and systems for access control so that, in the event of a hostile act, the ability to 
respond is improved. 
4. Detecting security issues in application middleware. This includes code analysis to 
identify problems in application codes before compromises can occur, as well as the 
ability to identify configuration errors in running applications. 
 
With these tools, it will be possible to address the specific issues differentiating HPC 
sites such as NERSC from large corporations such as Google.  
5. Long-Term Goals  
There are three general issues seen for the long term goals: data volume, application 
complexity, and information integration. Data volume not only represents problems 
related to increased network speeds, but also of storage, file systems and distributed 
applications. Application complexity deals with distributed applications (such as Grid 
services) and their related virtual organizations. Information integration is related to user 
activity auditing, but will take the individual problems solved in the short term goals and 
look at them from a collective perspective. 
 
As stressed above, there is no complete package which can be purchased for the 
emerging technologies being described here. Production quality tools need to be 
developed and assembled in such as way as to maximize flexibility and interoperability. 
 
To address these long term goals, the following general solutions are proposed: 
  
1. Network capacity — A fundamental issue needing to be addressed is doing 
production-quality network intrusion detection and analysis at speeds up to 100 
Gb/s. Given current limitations in hardware design, some sort of hardware 
acceleration will be required. 
 
2. Process accounting abstraction — A tool that will allow system and security 
managers to gather process accounting information for a given user across a 
number of systems via the same interface. 
 
3. Cross-site file system issues — In addition to the issues created by inter-system 
file system use, more complicated problems arise when these are extended across 
site boundaries. 
 
4. Project accounts and VOs — As projects become larger and more collaborative, 
creating a means for assigning and tracking user identities as well as associated 
permissions and accounting data in a way that is consistent across arbitrary 
locations will be necessary. 
 
5. Tools for identifying correlations between different security events — In the short 
term goals, individual tools will be developed for security analysis and anomaly 
detection for a set of given functions. What we are looking for is to tie together 
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different data types to get a significantly clearer picture of a given security event. 
For example, correlating an outbound IRC connection and process accounting 
info, or web server error messages and network traffic. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1 describes functional requirements for each of the three network segments. 
 
Table 1. Network Comparison: NERSC vs. Large Corporation 
  NERSC Large Corporation 
External 
Network 
Traffic 
patterns  
Thousands of very large 
connections (100 MB–100 GB) 
through a single border. 
Billions of very small connections (10 
KB) geographically distributed. 
 Network size Very large. Medium. 
 Network 
rates 
10–40 Gb/s linked with 10 
gigabit routers. Supporting data 
rates >1 Gb/s. Systems with 10 
gigabit interfaces. 
1–10 Gb/s linked with 10 gigabit 
routers. Supporting connection rates 
>100,000 connections/second. 
Systems with 1 gigabit interfaces. 
 Supported 
systems 
HPC systems, archival mass 
storage systems, remote 
visualization, web servers, email 
gateways, DNS servers. 
Arrays of redundant web servers, email 
gateways, DNS servers. 
 Protocols Access is primarily authenticated 
SSH logins, Grid protocols, and 
FTP large file transfers. 
Access is primarily unauthenticated 
web queries with a smaller number of 
authenticated transactions. 
 User base Thousands of users working 
collaboratively. 
Millions of individual users. 
Main 
Networks 
Traffic 
patterns  
Interactive sessions, 
transactional data. 
Interactive sessions, transactional data, 
large database synchronization. 
 Network size Small campus office. Very large campus office. 
 Network 
rates 
100–1000 Mb/s linked with 
1 gigabit routers. 
100–1000 Mb/s linked with 10 gigabit 
routers. 
 Supported 
systems 
Small number of offices, internal 
email servers, file servers, 
printers, internal web servers, 
non-sensitive databases. 
Very large number of offices, internal 
email servers, file servers, printers, 
internal web servers, development and 
research systems, non-sensitive 
databases. 
 Protocols Web, email, print, SSH. Web, email, print, SSH. 
 User base ~60 staff and visitors. Thousands of staff and visitors. 
Sensitive 
Networks 
Traffic 
patterns  
Interactive sessions and 
transactional data. 
Interactive sessions, transactional data, 
large database synchronization. 
 Network size Very small. Large. 
 Network 
rates 
100 Mb/s protected with 100 
Mbit firewalls. 
1–10 Gb/s protected with arrays of 1 
Gbit firewalls. 
 Supported 
systems 
Sensitive databases, security 
systems, configuration 
management/control systems. 
Sensitive databases, security systems, 
configuration management/control 
systems, proprietary data systems, 
financial systems. 
 Protocols SSH, SNMP, syslog, database 
communications. 
SSH, SNMP, syslog, database 
communications. 
 User base ~25 system/security analysts 
and DBAs. 
Thousands of programmers, 
researchers, DBAs, system/security 
analysts. 
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Applications  Development Developed using formal methods 
by a small group of professional 
developers 
Developed as research codes by small 
to very large groups of scientists.  
 Interfaces Well defined interfaces and 
protocols 
Rapidly changing interfaces 
 Time Period Once developed and tested – 
applications tend to not change 
for a substantial period 
Change on the order of weeks to 
months 
 Users Large numbers of users who use 
predefined functions but are not 
developing or changing code 
Small to moderate number of users 
who use the codes for production 
science runs while also modify the 
codes to provide improvements 
 Number of 
Applications 
10-20 of applications 500-1,000 applications 
 
Looking at the primary differences between the two requirement sets, a number of items 
stand out as unnecessary for large corporations, yet essential for the NERSC model. This 
constitutes a set of requirements for which there is a lesser financial incentive for 
networking and security vendors. These basic differences include: 
 
1. Effective security for high speed data connections. 
While large corporations have Internet links at 1–10 gigabit speeds, few if any are 
trying to sustain single data connections above a few Mb/s. A firewall or IDS 
designed to function well with millions of connections per second will not be 
appropriate for use in a network that has a few data connections at greater than 
gigabit speeds. Typical methods for large corporate IDS and firewalls involve load-
balancing network traffic across arrays of gigabit systems. These arrays cannot 
support individual connection speeds above 1 gigabit but can aggregate to 20 gigabits 
given enough flows. For security systems to function correctly, the load balancing 
must be consistent for any given host pair, guaranteeing that no more than 1 gigabit 
per client can be reached. 
 
2. Most common services and protocols. 
For most large corporations, the main interface for their business is a public web 
server. This is in contrast with the NERSC environment, which provides dozens of 
unique services along with ad hoc services developed by the user community for their 
own projects.  
 
A byproduct of this is that while there is a single general protocol (HTTP) which is 
used by large corporations, there are dozens of unique protocols used by NERSC. 
Each of these services represents a different cross section of security threats. In 
several cases (such as with the Grid services), there are a number of vectors that do 
not have a significant parallel within the business community. This represents a 
significant security problem which lives outside the scope of a typical enterprise 
environment, but which needs to be addressed by NERSC. 
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3. Heterogeneous systems. 
In the same way that the number and variety of applications and protocols is greater 
in the NERSC environment, the number and variety of operating systems on the DMZ 
is also larger. For most large corporate web services, there is a well defined operating 
system and architecture which can be linearly scaled as required for performance 
reasons. NERSC acquires major systems through an open procurement process and 
fields multiple systems — often from different vendors — at the same time. This 
results in a mix of OS types which greatly complicates the problem of whole site 
security. 
 
4. Shell access for a geographically diverse user community. 
A significant difference between the typical web based service providers and NERSC 
is interactive shell access. Corporate security methods typically center on preventing 
and detecting shell access. Because a major part of NERSC’s mission requires 
providing this access, a greater level of system auditing and keystroke analysis is 
required. 
 
In addition, the user community tends to be spread across multiple DOE HPC 
facilities as well as dozens of universities. Complications arise with user 
identification and communication in the event of a compromise. This is in direct 
contrast to the millions of (relatively) anonymous transactions processed daily by web 
based service providers. 
 
5. Interfaces, functions and decomposition. 
Most commercial software is formally developed, has well defined interface 
functions, and is decomposed into different functions. This allows the use of 
application-specific firewalls, restricted virtual machines, and other technology to 
limit risk. In the open science activities supported by NERSC and others, the 
scientists are both the developers and the users of the codes. Rather than a few well-
defined applications, HPC facilities run hundreds, even thousands of different codes, 
and the facilities have no control and for the most part little understanding of the 
application behavior.  
 
These points represent differences between the environments found in most general web 
service providers and that found at NERSC (as representative of the HPC community). 
For NERSC, they also represent specific real-world security problems requiring workable 
solutions that can be extended across multiple sites in a flexible enough manner to 
address ad hoc virtual organizations which traverse traditional boundaries and 
relationships. 
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